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RENUNCIATION OF RIGHT AND 
REMISSION OF DEBT IN 
COMPARATIVE AND ISRAELI 
LAW* 
ALFREDO M. RABELLO** 
I. RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN COMPARATIVE 
LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Renunciation and remission are not comprehensively 
treated in recent Israeli legislation. And although the legislature 
has referred to these terms in the course of its legislation, they 
are nowhere defined. 
The first reference to these terms, chronologically speaking, 
is in section 1 (c) of the Gift Law, 1968: "A gift may consist of 
the donor's renunciation of a right against the donee or in the 
donor's remission of an obligation of the donee towards him. "1 
The chapter treating "Several Debtors and Creditors," the 
* Edited by Jeffrey H. Voight. 
** Montesquieu Professor of Comparative Law and Legal History, Faculty of Law, 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Head of the Harry and Michael Sacher Institute 
for legislative research and Comparative Law. 
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Guido Tedeschi and concerns 
one of the areas of law to which Professor Tedeschi contributed at various times. But is 
there any field of Israeli civil law that Professor Tedeschi did not consider with the ana-
lytic clarity and the systematic approach that characterized his work? 
The history of Israel's private law is inextricably bound to the guiding work of Pro-
fessor Tedeschi. His research and activity in drafting laws and preparing comprehensive 
commentaries paved the way for the new Israeli legislation. We who were privileged to 
study under him owe our teacher a great debt. 
I also wish to thank Dr. Hanina Ben-Menahem, Mr. Pablo Lerner, Dr. Renee 
Sanilevic and Mr. Ram Shamgar for their assistance in seeking the comparative sources. 
1. Gift Law, § 1 (c), 22 L.S.1. 113 (Isr.). 
39 
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Contracts (General Part) Law,s provides an enlightening refer-
ence to the terms under discussion. Section 55 (c) states: "If the 
creditor discharges one of the debtors of the whole or part of the 
obligation - by way of waiver, remission, compromise or other-
wise - the other is discharged to the same extent, unless a differ-
ent intention appears from the discharge."3 Thus we have before 
us a list of terms (renunciation, waiver, remission, compromise, 
discharge) that often appear in modern codes as factors that ter-
minate a debt by means other than performance. 
How shall we define the terms renunciation and remission? 
Are we obliged to make recourse to English law? I have already 
taken the opportunity to express my opposition to that method 
of construction.· In interpreting new code laws, the commenta-
tor must interpret the law "from within the law itself." He must 
define terms both according to their meanings in a specific law 
and in other Israeli laws. According to the late Professor Zeltner, 
the reference in section 55(c) of the Contracts Law is not rele-
vant for the purpose of general construction, as that section "re-
fers to waiver and renunciation in but a specific context, that is, 
in the context of joint debtors."11 In his opinion, this context, 
therefore, affects only the special rule of the effect of discharge 
on one of the debtors. This objection would appear to be ex-
tremely formal. In a law that sets brevity as a goal, as does [Is-
raeli] law, even a brief reference may serve to elucidate the legis-
lative intent. This is particularly so when we may draw a general 
principle by induction from the specific rule, as in the case 
before us, from which we may learn by what means a creditor 
may release a debtor from his obligation. 
Today, after the enactment of the Foundations of Law Act, 
1980,8 recourse to English law for the purpose of construing the 
terms renunciation and remission is particularly problematic. 
Rather, we should adopt an approach that would explain juris-
prudential terms in light of the general systems of Israeli law, 
2. Contracts (General Part) Law, § 55 (c), 27 L.S.I. 117, at 125 (1973) (lsr.). 
3. [d. 
4. Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, The Gift Law, 5728-1968 , in COMMENTARY OF LAWS 
RELATING TO CONTRACTS 66 (Guido Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1979). 
5. Estate of Finklestein v. Finklestein 22 (i) P.O. 618 (1968) (Jsr.). 
6. Foundations Law Act, 34 L.S.I. 181 (1980) (Isr.). We refer especially to the sec-
tion repealing recourse to English law as the basis of Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-
Council. 
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while showing a willingness to learn from other legal systems. 
After all, Israeli law was not created ex nihilo, but came into 
existence only after foreign systems were already in force (e.g., 
Ottoman and English law) and after civil code systems were ex-
tant in the West. 
Therefore, in order to examine the terms under discussion, 
we shall follow a comparative approach.' In so doing, we shall 
also look to Jewish law. We will focus on the question of whether 
we are concerned with 1) a unilateral or bilateral act and 2) 
upon the issue of what approach would be most suitable for fu-
ture legislation. We shall conduct our study in the light of the 
historical development of Israeli law by examining the Mejelle, 
Jewish law, English law, as well as other legal systems. 
B. MEJELLE 
We find mention of remission of debts in Article 847 of the 
Mejelle, in the chapter treating gifts: 
If a person to whom money is due makes a 
gift of such money to the person from whom the 
money is due, or releases the debtor from pay-
ment thereof, such gift or release is valid, and the 
debt is forthwith extinguished, provided that the 
debtor does not decline to agree thereto.8 
We are here concerned with an act of unilateral waiver that 
is realized by the will of the beneficiary alone, with the possibil-
ity provided for the debtor to oppose the waiver. Absent such 
opposition, the debt is discharged. 
In Book II, concerning "Settlement and Release," the 
7. See Zeev Zeltner, Thoughts on the Draft Bill of the Contracts (General Part) 
Law 5730- 1970 , 3 IYUNEI MISHPAT 121, at 132 (1973). It is well-known that Professor 
Zeltner was one of the leading proponents of this method, at least insofar as German law 
is concerned. But this approach is not foreign, within certain limits, also to: Aharon 
Barak, The Independence of the New Civil Codification: Risks and Prospects 7 MISHPA-
TIM 15, at 24 (1976); Uri Yadin, Again on the Interpretation of Knesset Laws, 26 
HAPRAKLIT 358, at 364 (1970); Daniel Friedmann, On the Interpretation of Modern Is-
raeli Legislation, 5 IYUNEI MISHPAT 463 et seq. (1977). 
8. All sections brought here are as translated in C.A. HOOPER. THE CIVIL LAW OF 
PALESTINE AND TRANS-JORDAN, Vol. I (Jerusalem, 1933), Vol. II (Jerusalem, 1936). 
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Mejelle makes specific reference to renunciation and remission. 
Article 1562 is of particular interest: 
If any person releases any other person from 
any obligation, such obligation ceases to exist and 
he can no longer make any claim in connection 
therewith [see Article 51].9 
On its face, the unilateral nature is clearly emphasized. The 
debtor's consent is not required, though he may refuse to accept 
the release.1o If the debtor has already expressed his acceptance 
of the remission, he may not later change his mind. However, 
the opinion has been expressed that remission in Hanafic Is-
lamic law resembles a bilateral act.ll 
We have not found in Israeli literature or case law any wide-
spread consideration of the questions under study. When the 
questions have been considered, it has often been after both re-
cent Israeli legislation and the Gift Lawl2 came into effect. 
With new Israeli law in effect for some years now, compari-
sons with Ottoman law are rare, especially as the Mejelle has 
ceased to be binding law in Israel. 13 
9. [d. 2 Article 1562. 
10. This was the view of Prof. Tedeschi, as well, who writes, inter alia: "Other than 
the Mejelle, there is no law, either in practice or proposed, that grants force to remission 
as a unilateral act". Guido Tedeschi, Repeal of Mejelle - Background and Timing, 2 
IVUNEI MISHPAT 458, at 459 (1972). See also Guido Tedeschi, About the Gift Law 11 
MISHPATIM 639, at 642 (1969). 
11. CHAFIK CHEHATA, THEORIE GENERAL DE L'OBLIGATION EN DROIT MUSULMAN 
HANEFITE 93 et seq. (Paris, 1969). This is the opinion of Chehata: "L'acceptation du 
debiteur n'est point exigee. II semble cependent qu'elle est toujours presumee. . . La 
remise est si bien consideree comme une convention qU'elle est assimilee a un contrat 
translatif de propriete .. La remise peut revetir la forme d'une transaction d'une dette, 
elle, n'est jamais possible que si elle est consentie au debiteur. Elle s'analyse alors en 
effet, en remise de dette." (I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Yaacov Meron for refer-
ring me to Chehata's book). If this is indeed the case, then in Islamic law, as well, we 
find the same procedure found in many other legal systems, emphasizing the consensual 
nature of remission. 
12. Gift Law, § 1 (c), 22 L.S.I. 113 (lsr.). -
13. GUIDO TEDESCHI, REPEAL OF THE MEJELLE LAW, 5744-1984. See also id., The Cen-
tenary of the Mejelle, 25 HAPRAKLIT 59 (1969); Id., Repeal of Mejelle, supra note 10; 
id., Le Centenaire de la Mejelle, REV. INT. DE DROIT COMPARE, 125 (1969). 
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C. JEWISH LAW 
The accepted rule in Jewish law is that remission does not 
require a formal act of transfer (kinyan) but can be effected 
orally.14 Nevertheless, in many places it was customary to per-
form a formal act or even to draft a bill of remission, though this 
served for evidentiary purposes and was not conclusive. How-
ever, if a formal act or document was made, this could serve to 
preclude a later claim of insincerity by the remitter. Rabbinic 
authorities differ as to whether remission by document was the 
same as oral remission, and some ruled that written remission 
required the performance of a formal transfer, since drawing up 
a document of remission and leaving that document in the pos-
session of the creditor would appear contradictory. 111 
From the writings of Maimonides, it seems possible to infer 
that he held that remission constituted a transfer of the debt to 
the debtor, as he states: "He who remits a debtor a deposit, 
which he holds, to another ... "18 The accepted view however, is 
that remission is a waiver of the debt, not merely a transfer, and 
that "remission is nothing more than the discharge of the servi-
tude."17 In the Law of Acquisition and Gift 3:2, Maimonides 
himself writes: 'If he remits a debt that he holds against him or 
gives him the deposit that was deposited with him."18 In other 
words, the accepted view considers remission a unilateral act by 
the grantor. The sources do not directly consider whether the 
debtor may reject the remission. In regard to gifts, the assump-
tion is that the donee may decline the gift upon r~ceiving notice 
of it. The donee's explicit consent is not required, and he is pre-
sumed to consent unless he explicitly expresses opposition. In 
regard to remission, it may be said that the question depends on 
the above two approaches as they relate to the nature of 
remission. 
Rabbi Herzog writes: 
14. Maimonides 5:11 (Mishneh Torah), Law of Sales, Acquisition and Gift, 3:2. 
15. SHULKHAN ARUKH, HOSHEN MISHPAT, ch. 241, § 2; 2 IZHAK HERZOG, THE MAIN 
INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 230 (3d ed., London, 1967). 
16. Maimonides 5:6 (Mishneh Torah), Law of Sales. 
17. Rashba 40:262. 
18. Maimonides 3:2 (Mishneh Torah), Aquisition and Gift. 
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Mehilah is not of the nature of transfer 
(haknaah), but of mere withdrawal. That is, the 
creditor does not in any sense transfer his right to 
the debtor, which would, of course, automatically 
extinguish the claim, but he withdraws his right 
or revokes his lien from the debtor and his estate. 
This deeper understanding of mehilah is not 
without practical legal effects. Suppose A told B 
that he waived the debt due to him from the lat-
ter, and B declined at the moment to avail him-
self of the waiver. If mehilah is viewed as a kind 
of transfer, it has failed to take effect since B de-
clined; if as mere withdrawal, it has taken effect.19 
[Vol. 1:39 
Given the prevailing view that remission is a discharge of 
the creditor's servitude and a unilateral act, it is reasonable to 
assume that the debtor's knowledge of the remission is unneces-
sary. However, we find in the Arukh HaShulkhan: 
There are those who are satisfied with remis-
sion that is not in the presence of the borrower, if 
it is a remission, and I am of the opinion that it is 
remission ... but this is when the borrower is in-
formed of the remission and he intends to acquire 
his money. But if he has not yet been informed, 
the lender may retract, as every acquisition does 
not apply to remission and that when the lender's 
servitude is lifted, it remains in the hands of the 
borrower. In any case, as long as the borrower is 
not informed, the servitude is not lifted.20 
The approach of the author of Arukh HaShulkhan is in line 
with the view that remission is a form of transfer of the debt to 
the debtor, as he himself states. But it would seem that his at-
tempt to apply the requirement of knowledge of the remission 
even to the other approach is not successful, and Rabbi Herzog 
questioned this in his book.21 Indeed, the author of Mahaneh 
Ephraim wrote: "It would appear that when he remits the debt 
to the debtor, his servitude is discharged from the moment he 
states his remission, even if the borrower does not consent 
"22 
19. HERZOG, supra note 15, at 229. 
20. ARUKH HASHULKHAN, HILKHOT MATANA, ch. 241, § 4. 
21. HERZOG, supra note 15, at 232. 
22. MAHANEH EPHRAIM, HILKHOT ZEKHIA MEHEFKER, ch. 11. 
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As stated, remission is performed orally, but it can be in-
ferred from the remitter conduct. The classic example is that of 
a widow who does not demand the price of her marriage contract 
(ketubah) for a period of twenty-five years after her husband's 
death and who is, therefore, presumed to have waived her rights 
under the contract. The responsa literature considers this ques-
tion at length, but for our purpose, the conclusion that remission 
can be inferred from conduct suffices. 
D. ENGLISH LAW 
1. Waiver 
The term waiver has various meanings in English law. Lord 
Wright, commenting on the vagueness of the term, stated: 
The word "waiver" is a vague term used in 
many senses. It is always necessary to ascertain in 
what sense and with what restrictions it is used in 
any particular case. It is sometimes used in the 
sense of election as where a party decides between 
two mutually exclusive rights. Thus, in the old 
phrase, he claims in assumpsit and waives the 
tort. It is also used where a party expressly or im-
pliedly gives up a right to enforce a condition or a 
right to rescind a contract, or prevents perform-
ance, or announces that he will refuse perform-
ance or loses an equitable right by laches.23 
The most common use of the term in contract law is in 
describing a situation wherein one party to a contract relin-
quishes his right to performance of a certain stipulation by not 
insisting upon his right to its perfect performance, be it before 
or after breach of that stipulation: 
In the law of contract, however, it is most com-
monly used to describe the process whereby one 
party voluntarily grants a concession to the other 
party by not insisting upon the precise mode of 
performance provided for in the contract, whether 
before or after any breach of the term is waived.24 
23. Smyth (Ross T) & Co. Ltd. v. Bailey, Son & Co. 3 All E.R. 60, 70 (1940) (Eng.). 
24. See 9 HALSBURY, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 571 (4th ed. 1974). 
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The term waiver appears in various contexts, of which three 
are germane to our study:211 
a. In the sense of rescission, waiver may mean absolute abroga-
tion of the contract,28 in which case consideration is required for 
realization.27 
b. In the sense of variation, waiver is taken to mean a change 
in a contractual obligation that is accompanied by· consideration 
and is therefore valid.28 The term also appears in the context of 
variation: despite being supported by consideration, the waiver 
is for some reason lacking contractual force. This is so, for exam-
ple, in regard to the rule that a written contract can be orally 
r~scinded but can be changed only in writing. In other words, an 
oral variation of an existing contract is not valid. However, if 
what is done constitutes a waiver or abstention from requiring 
perfect performance of the written contract, then parole evi-
dence of the waiver may be admitted. The distinction between 
variation and waiver is ambiguous, but the accepted opinion is 
that where a change in the contractual obligations and relations 
is such that it changes the structure of the contract, then it is 
not a waiver, but a variation.29 
In Hickman v. Haynes30 the case revolved around a contract 
for the sale of iron, which was to be delivered in the month of 
June. The date of delivery was later changed at the buyer's oral 
request. Despite the extension, the buyer did not fulfil his obli-
gations, refusing to accept delivery. The seller brought an action 
for breach of the original contract. The Court, in accepting the 
seller's claim, ruled: 
There was no fresh agreement ... which can 
be regarded as having been substituted for the 
original written contract. There was nothing more 
than a waiver by the defendants of a delivery by 
25. See GUENTER HEINZ TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 83 (6th ed. 1983). 
26. Price v. Dyes, 17 Ves 356, 364 (1810) (Eng.): "The waiver spoken of in the case is 
an entire abandonment and dissolution of the contract." 
27. Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. 2 A.C. 250, 262 
(1922) (Eng.): "To say that a claim is to be waived is incorrect if a right has accrued. It 
must be released or discharged by deed or upon consideration." 
28. Brikom Investments Ltd. v. Carr, Q.B. 467, 488, 491 (1979) (Eng.). 
29 .. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 572. 
30. Hickman v. Hayes, L.R. 100 C.P. 598 (1875) (Eng.). 
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the plaintiff in June.81 
c. In the sense of forbearance, where the change in the original 
contract is not binding due to a failure of consideration, or in 
the absence of a substantive condition for the creation of an ob-
ligation (e.g., a written document) there still may be legal effect 
due to the fact of waiver, as in the following circumstances:82 
A. The party that asks forbearance is unable 
to refuse the change. For example, if the seller 
makes late delivery at the buyer's request, the 
buyer cannot refuse to accept delivery on the 
grounds that the performance is at a date later 
than that stipulated in the contact. 
B. In the event that the altered condition was 
performed and fulfilled, neither party may de-
mand damages on the grounds of deviation from 
the original contract. 
C. The party that waives a right is obligated 
by his waiver if he led the other party to believe 
that late performance would be accepted. How-
ever, at any time before that date, reasonable no-
tice maybe served and performance demanded on 
the original date.88 
2. Means for Effecting Waiver 
A waiver may be expressed or implied from 
[sic] conduct, but in either case it must amount to 
an unambiguous representation arising as the re-
sult of a positive and intentional act done by the 
party granting the concession with knowledge of 
all the material circumstances. Furthermore, it 
seems that for a waiver to operate effectively the 
party to whom the concession is granted must act 
in reliance of the concession.84 
31. ld. at 604. 
32. TREITEL, supra note 25. 
33. Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim 1 K.B. 616 (1950) (Eng.). 
34. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 574. 
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It follows that if a condition for realizing the waiver is that 
the party for whose benefit the waiver was made actually acted 
in reliance upon it, then the waiver cannot be viewed as a unilat-
eral act but as a bilateral, legal transaction. 
An exception to this is the case where the condition waived 
is to the benefit of the party who makes the waiver. In such cir-
cumstances, he may waive his rights without giving notice to the 
other party.35 
3. Release 
Release is an act by which a party renounces his right 
against the other party to a contract: 
A release is an act of one of the parties to a 
contract discharging a right of action against the 
other which arises out of the contract.Be 
The release may be made under seal, in which case no con-
sideration is needed,37 or it may be made orally with considera-
tion. An oral release without consideration is nothing but an ex-
pression of intent not to enforce a right, and has no binding 
legal force. There are three exceptions to this rule, by which re-
lease without consideration nevertheless is binding: 
1. When the plaintiff is estopped by conduct. 
2. When a debtor is appointed executor for his creditors, it 
is equivalent to release. 
3. When a holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note 
renounces his right by transfer of the instrument to the other 
party with intent to release him from his obligation. 
The rules for contractual obligation apply, as well, to the 
means for effecting release. Therefore, it would appear that re-
35. 1 JOSEPH CHI'ITY. CHI'ITY ON CONTRACTS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 825 (25th ed. 
London, 1983). 
36. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 594. 
37. Preston v. Christmas 22 Wils 86 (1759) (Eng.). 
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lease is a bilateral, legal transaction. That English law requires 
consideration for effecting release (subject to the above excep-
tions) supports the conclusion that it is a bilateral act in English 
law.38 
E. FRENCH LAW 
The subject of renunciation and remission is treated in the 
Code ciuil.39 Renunciation of a real right can be effected unilat-
erally (Le., upon abandonment property becomes res nullius.)40 
However, regarding the renunciation of a debt (remise de dette), 
the French code explicitly requires that there be decharge con-
uentionelle!l The obligatory right can be discharged only by the 
agreement of the creditor and the debtor. If the debtor does not 
accept the creditor's renunciation, it is without effect and the 
creditor may retract his declaration of renunciation up to its ac-
ceptance by the debtor. The bilateral nature of the act is abso-
lutely clear due to the demand for the debtor's consent. Even in 
France, there is no lack of jurists critical of this structure who 
would prefer that there be a possibility for renunciation by the 
creditor's unilateral act!2 But the accepted view is that, inas-
much as a gift is viewed as a bilateral, legal transaction, which is 
based upon the agreement of donor and donee, there is no rea-
son to change the system for the renunciation of debts alone, 
which, too, is a form of gift.43 
Viewing renunciation of debts as a form of gift brings 
French law to the demand for intention de liberalite', animus 
donandi: absent intention to benefit, there is no renunciation. 
Therefore, French law does not consider renunciation a com pro-
38. Zeltner reaches a similar conclusion concerning English law, see 2 ZEEV ZELTNER, 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 130 (Tel Aviv, in Hebrew, 1976): "In 
such circumstances, there is a fundamental rule concerning recourse to English law that 
renunciation and remission be effected by contract, a rule that, in English law, derives 
from the very requirement of consideration." 
39. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.) arts. 1282 . 1288 (Fr.). 
40. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 514 (Paris, 1974); HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., 
LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 1101 (Paris, 1973). 
41. C. CIV. arts. 1285 and 1287 (Fr.). 
42. 2 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 690 (Paris, 1957); 
4 CARBONNIER, supra note 40, at 514; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1001. On the 
theory of Juristic Act (act juridique) in general, see GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON & DAVID 
PLiMLEY DERHAM, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 315 et seq. (4th ed. Oxford, 1972). 
43. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1107. 
11
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mise agreement (concordat), whereby creditors waive part of 
their rights. Because creditors do not compromise in order to 
benefit the debtor, they believe that only this course will offer a 
measure of satisfaction.44 Many jurists have argued that a dis-
tinction should be drawn between remission of debt based upon 
agreement with animus donandi, and unilateral renunciation of 
a right deriving from an obligation. In their opinion, the object 
of the renunciation in the latter case is not to benefit the debtor, 
but to liberate the creditor from the burden of a debt that is 
more troublesome than it is worth. This approach, too, is re-
jected because a contract is a legal bond between two parties, 
and every matter concerning that bond is subject to the agree-
ment of both parties. Therefore, remission of debt (remise of 
dette) is a form of agreement. 'II 
A further question is whether a remission of debt is necessa-
rily gratuitous, or whether it may be granted for consideration. 
Generally speaking, remission of a debt is by nature given gratu-
itously, as an indirect form of gift. However, there is the possi-
bility for the remission of a debt to form an element grounding a 
transaction for consideration.46 This opinion is not unanimously 
held, and there are jurists who argue that remission can be 
granted gratuitously, as a gift lacking form.47 In our opinion, the 
former approach is preferable. Renunciation can be granted ei-
ther gratuitously or for consideration, and remission of debt can 
form an element of a transaction such as delegation or nova-
tion.48 The legal reality requires both forms of renunciation. 
F. GERMAN LAW 
German law explicitly treats a "Contract of release" and an 
"acknowledgment that the debt does not exist:" 
1. An obligation expires if the debtor is re-
leased from the obligation by agreement with the 
creditor. 
44. [d. at 1102. 
45. 1 PIERRE RAYNAUD & GABRIEL MARTY, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 853 (Paris, 
1962). 
46, 4 CARBONNIER, supra note 40, at 514. 
47. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1101 et seq. 
48. 1 RAYNAUD & MARTY, supra note 45, at 853. 
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2. The same applies if the creditor by con-
tract with the debtor acknowledges that the obli-
gation does not exist.·9 
51 
The language of the law makes it clear that the subject is a 
contract of release. Thus, agreement - a meeting of the minds -
is required. The accepted view is that a debtor's silence is con-
strued as consent to the remission of his debt,IiO but it is empha-
sized that no legal consequences arise from unilateral 
remission. iiI 
Remission is viewed as a form of gift. However, it can also 
come about as the result of a prior obligation to grant remission 
under given circumstances. Similarly, remission can form part of 
an agreement or a more general transaction, in which case its 
fate will be the same as that of the entire transaction itself.1i2 A 
distinction should be drawn between the contract of release and 
the pactum de non petendo (an agreement not to sue). In the 
latter case, the obligation continues to exist, but the debtor is 
granted a defence (exception) that neutralizes the creditor's ac-
tion.1i3 In German law, too, a distinction is made between re-
lease, which is a contract, and renunciation. Release is viewed as 
a sub-class of renunciation. Release refers only to obligations, 
whereas renunciation is a broader concept that refers to other 
rights as well. Ii. 
E.J. Cohn clearly defines the distinction for jurists versed in 
the Common Law: 
As the doctrine of consideration plays no part 
in German Law, German Law has no difficulty 
whatsoever in recognizing the validity of a con-
tract by which the creditor - with or without con-
sideration - releases the debtor from his liability. 
49. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (Civil Code), § 397, (I.S. Forrester et al. trans., 
New Jersey, 1975) (F.R.G.). 
50. 1 KARL LARENZ. LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL 217 (11th ed. 
1976); 1 JUERGEN EssER. SCHULDRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TElL 179 (4th ed., 1920). 
51. WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER. SCHULDRECHT 207 (7th ed. Berlin, 1985). 
52. LARENZ, supra note 50. 
53. See id. at 219 on pactum de non petendo; ADOLPH BERGER. ENCYCLOPEDIC DIc-
TIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 615 (Philadelphia, 1953). 
54. 2 SOERGEL-SIEBERT. KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 492 (1967). 
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This contract (Erlass) is not subject to any form 
(section 397, BGB). It may therefore, be implied 
from the attitude of the parties. Its effect is the 
immediate discharge of the debtor.GG 
[Vol. 1:39 
There are certain exceptions to the contractual characterG6 
of renunciation in the laws of obligations; for example, the case 
of deposit under sections 372 - 386 of the BGB.G7 That proce-
dure concerns a situation wherein the debtor deposits payment 
of his debt to the creditor's account in a public institution estab-
lished for that purpose. The debtor retains the right to withdraw 
the funds as long as the creditor has not given notice of accept-
ance of the deposit. The debtor's right of withdrawal ceases if he 
declares to the institution that he waives his right to recover the 
deposit. Ci6 This is an exceptional case which proves the rule that, 
in the law of obligations, renunciation is bilateral. Ci9 
Under certain circumstances, failure to exercise a right over 
a period of years is tantamount to renunciation.60 However, the 
law always requires that there be both intention to renounce 
and knowledge of this requirement. It must be clear to the par-
ties, beyond all doubt, that renunciation of a debt is involved. 
Another example of renunciation by conduct can be found in the 
case where a divorcing couple drafts an agreement for the divi-
sion of their property and later the parties remarry. The second 
marriage can be viewed as a renunciation of the rights that 
would have arisen from the divorce agreement. Certain rights 
can be renounced only to the extent established by law, as in the 
case of maintenance payments,61 or minimum wages. Lastly, as 
renunciation of debt constitutes a contract between the creditor 
and the debtor, German law establishes that a renunciation con-
tract cannot be made for the benefit of a third party.62 
55. 1 ERNST JOSEPH COHN. MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 236 (2d ed. London, 1968). 
56. PALANDT BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 397, 436 (46th ed. Milnchen, 1986). 
57. BGB, §§ 372 - 386 (F.R.G). 
58. BGB, § 376 (2) (1) (F.R.G.). 
59. See also in the case law 722 RGZ 171; 110 RGZ 418. 
60. 16 RGZ 1865 (F.R.G.). 
61. BOB § 1360 (A); see also §§ 1616, 1615 (E) (F.R.G.). 
62. PALANDT, supra note 56. 
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G. SWISS LAW 
Swiss law treats remission of debts as follows: 
A partial or total discharge of an obligation 
by agreement need not be formal, even where the 
contracting thereof by law or arrangement be-
tween the parties required a particular form.83 
53 
It is clear from the Code's language that an agreement be-
tween the parties is required. Remission of a debt can be by way 
of gift, but in such cases the requirements for gifts - other than 
those regarding form8• - must be fulfilled. 
If the renunciation concerns proprietary rights, Swiss law, 
too, distinguishes between remission, which is a contract - a bi-
lateral, juristic act - and renunciation, which is both broader and 
unilateral. The causa for remission of an obligation can be either 
of a beneficiary character (donandi), or of a normal, transaction 
nature (acquirendi), as in the case where a creditor releases a 
debtor on the condition that the debtor promptly pays another 
obligation.811 
H. ITALIAN LAW 
The point of reference in Italian law is the "Declaration of 
remission of debt," which establishes: 
The declaration of the creditor remitting the 
debt extinguishes the obligation when it is com-
municated to the debtor (1334), unless the latter 
declares within a reasonable time that he does not 
wish to avail himself of it.88 
63. Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Code des obligations, Codice delle obliga-
zioni [Code of Obligations, OR, Co, Co], § 115 (Discharge by agreement) (Switz.). 
64. 6 BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHT. OBLIGATIONEN, 604 
(Bern, 1941-1945); THOMAS GUHL. DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONSRECHT 268 et. seq. 
(Zurich, 1972). 
65. PIERRE ENGEL. TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT SUISSE 514 et seq. (Neuchatel, 
1973). 
66. CODICE CIVILE (Civil Code) [C.c.] art. 1236 (M. Betrams, G.E. Longo, and J.H. 
Merryman trans. New York, 1969) (Italy). 
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The traditional approach viewed remissione as a unilateral, 
legal transaction. In other words, the creditor's declaration suf-
fices to discharge the obligation upon receipt of notice by the 
debtor, unless the latter gives timely notice of his desire not to 
benefit from the remission. The opportunity to void the effect of 
remission is given to the debtor as he may have an interest in 
fulfilling his obligation. This interest may be not only a moral 
one, expressing the common desire to keep promises, but may be 
commercial as well. Not every debtor wishes to be portrayed as 
unable to fulfill his obligations absent remission by his creditors. 
Such a situation could raise doubts in the minds of other pre-
sent or potential creditors. We have here another aspect of the 
principle nolenti non fit donatio. This doctrine views remissione 
as a unilateral act that requires acceptance (recettizia) and that 
remains pending for a period, conditional upon the debtor's non-
opposition. Opposition, too, is a unilateral act requiring accept-
ance that need not take a particular form. The possibility of a 
declaration of opposition does not, according to the traditional 
view, change the nature of remission from a unilateral act to a 
bilateral one _. a contract. The result of the debtor's refusal is 
the revival of the original contract, but without those guarantees 
that existed prior to the remission and which automatically 
ceased upon the discharge of the primary contractual relation-
ship. As stated, this is the approach of traditional doctrine,S7 as 
well as of the case law.s8 
However, this approach has, in the past, been subjected to 
the criticism of important jurists,69 and this criticism has gained 
strength. It is argued that one cannot create an abstract struc-
ture for remission, since remission occurs at several different 
times: sometimes in accordance with the structure of article 
1236, which is a particular contractual form (particolare forma 
67. Ernesto Tilocca, Remissione del debito, in 15 NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 389 
et seq. (Torino, 1968); ALBERTO TRABUCCHI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE 571 (27th ed. 
Padova, 1985); PIETRO RESCIGNO, MANUALE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO ITALIANO 632 et seq. 
(Napoli, 1985). 
68. See Judgment of May 10,1967 Casso n. 959 (according to which the result of 
acceptance is to make the remission irrevocable); See also, Judgment of June 24, 1968 
Casso n. 2111 (attributes the same result to the passage of reasonable time without the 
debtor's opposition) (Italy). 
69. GIUESEPPE STOLFI. TEORIA DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 50 et seq. (Padova, 1947); 
FRANCESCO CARIOTA FERRARA, IL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 140 et seq. (Milano, 1948); EMILIO 
BETTI. TEORIA GENERALE DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 293 (Torino, 1950). 
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contrattuale}; at times in the traditional contractual form; and 
at other times as a unilateral act, which does not require any 
steps be taken by the debtor, if the parties have so agreed in 
advance and have so empowered the creditor.70 The relationship 
between remission and renunciation (rinuncia) , too, has given 
rise to differences of opinion,71 though this is beyond the scope 
of our present study. 
I. SPANISH LAW 
In the Spanish code, we find reference only to remission,72 
with a distinction drawn between explicit remission (the creditor 
makes a formal declaration), and implied remission (for which 
the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the creditor waives 
his right}.73 When a note is held by the debtor, it is presumed 
that the note has been freely transferred to him by the creditor, 
unless otherwise proven.74 It is also presumed that the free 
transfer of a note was performed by way of remission, and not 
for consideration.75 
Remission is considered to be a legal transaction performed 
without consideration,'6 and the laws of gifts apply.77 
In Spain, too, the question has been raised as to whether 
70. PIETRO PERLINGIERI, REMISSIONE DEL DEBITO E RINUNCIA AL CREDITO (Napoli, 
1968); See his MODI DI ESTINZIONE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI DIVERSI DALL'ADEMPIMENTO,168 et 
seq. (Bologna. 1975). 
71. See Tilocca, supra note 67, for a discussion of the problems and references to 
the opposing literature. 
72. C6digo Civil (Civil Code) [C.CIV.J, arts. 1187-1194 (Spain): "De la Condonacion 
de la deuda". The doctrine also employs other terms, such as Quita, Remision, 
Renuncia. See 3 JOSE CASTAN TOBEN AS, DERECHO CIVIL ESPAGNOL COMUN Y FORAL, 393 
(Reus ed., Madrid, 1978). 
73. See 3 TOBENAs, supra note 72, at 397. As, for example, delivering the promissory 
note to the debtor (C.CIV. art. 1187, § 1 (Spain)) or delivering the security interest, 
though in this case the remission is only of the right to hold the security interest and not 
of the debt itself. 
74. C.CIV. art. 1189 (Spain). 
75. See C.Civ. art. 1188 (Spain). This system of presumptions has been subject to 
criticism under the doctrine, see 3 TOBENAs supra note 72, loco cit. See also infra the 
section concerning the Argentinean code. 
76. See 1 JOSE PUIG BRUTAu, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL 364 (Barcelona, 1959). 
This scholar objects to the very notion of remission for consideration. In his opinion, it is 
the absence of consideration that characterizes remission. 
77. C.CIV. art. 1187 (Spain). 
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remission is a unilateral or a bilateral act. Ruggiero is of the 
opinion that remission is unilateral and, therefore, the creditor's 
intent is sufficient to discharge the obligation. The debtor can-
not prevent the remission, and not every remission is to the 
debtor's benefit.78 According to Sanchez Rebullido, only explicit 
remission requires the debtor's consent and, therefore, such 
remission is a bilateral act.79 
But there are jurists who argue that the question has been 
improperly posed. According to Puig Brutau, it is irrelevant to 
establish, a priori, whether remission is unilateral or bilateral: 
the question is whether the creditor may withdraw the remis-
sion. In Brutau's opinion, where the creditor has unambiguously 
declared his intent to remit a particular debt, he may not with-
draw the remission.80 Therefore, remission is unilateral in char-
acter, ensuring the debtor's interest and faith. But the fact that 
the law applies the rules of gifts to remission, including the re-
quirement of consent81 is sufficient - in the opinion of Castan 
Tobenas - to establish that remission is bilateraP2 Moreover, ac-
cording to articles 632 and 633 of the Spanish code, the debtor's 
consent must be given in writing.83 In the case law, we find a 
strict approach to this requirement. The Supreme Court, in a 
decision from November 21, 1935, held that unless the debtor 
consents, remission cannot be inferred from the fact that the 
creditor sent a letter of waiver and did not act to collect for a 
period of thirteen years. Therefore, the Court allowed the credi-
tor to withdraw his remission.84 
78. See 3 TOBENAS, supra note 72, at 394. 
79. [d. 
80. See 1 BRUTAU, supra note 76, at 362-363. 
81. C.CIV. arts. 618 and 629 (Spain). 
82. See 1 BRUTAU, supra note 78, at 363. According to Puig Brutau, this assertion is 
quite weak. The consent of the other party does not characterize remission, because even 
absent consent the remission will be valid as an 'implied remission." 
83. C.CIV. art. 632-33 (Spain). Article 632 establishes that a gift of chattels requires 
the consent of the donee as long as the transfer of the object is not made simultaneously. 
Under article 633, a gift of real property requires a notarized protocol. The donee may 
express his consent in that protocol or in a separate protocol. 
84. See the decision in LEON MEDINA y MARANON, LEYES CIVILES DE ESPANA 338 
(Reus ed., Madrid, 1943). See criticism of this decision in 1 BRUTAU, supra note 76, at 
367 and in 3 TOBEN AS, supra note 72, at 395. 
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J. LATIN AMERICAN LAWS 
We shall now briefly review the codes of Latin America. It 
was to these codes that Prof. Tedeschi referred the Israeli legis-
lature for a desirable model of "legal technique:" 
. . . it is worthwhile considering whether it 
would not be wiser to adopt a more precise tech-
nique, such as is characteristic, for instance, of a 
number of South American codes, especially since 
a number of well-known European jurists tend to 
prefer this technique for various reasons.st! 
In general, Latin American laws do not distinguish between 
renunciation and remission, often considering them one and the 
same.86 In several countries, such as Chile87 and Uruguay,88 a 
distinction is drawn between an explicit remission and an im-
plied remission, performed by handing over or destroying a note. 
Other countries, such as Brazil,89 Venezuela90 and the Domini-
can Republic,91 treat only implied remission. 
In our brief discussion, we focus on Argentinean law, which 
clearly distinguishes between renunciation and remission.92 In 
Argentina, renunciation is defined as a legal transaction, 
whereby a person holding a right (personal, proprietary, or intel-
lectual) abandons it. Remission is a particular form of renuncia-
tion that relates to a creditor's rights alone.93 Here, too, we find 
scholars seeking to refine this distinction. They urge a differenti-
ation between 1) renunciation in the broad sense, wherein a per-
son completely renounces his right (in tatum), and 2) renuncia-
tion in the narrow sense, as where a person waives timely 
85. Guido Tedeschi, On the Technique of the Future Legislation in Israel, in 
STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW 69, 81 (Jerusalem, 1960). 
86. See C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] (Civil Code) § 2209 (Mex.). 
C6digo Civil (Civil Code) § 1515 (Uru.). 
87. COdigo Civil [C6D. CIV.} (Civil Code) § 1654 (Chile). 
88. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1517 (Uru.). 
89. C6digo Civil [C.C.} (Civil Code) § 1053 (Braz.). 
90. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1326 (Venez.). 
91. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1282 (Dom. Rep.). 
92. C6digo Civil [C6D. CIV.] (Civil Code) §§ 868-887 (Arg.). See §§ 868-875 for re-
nunciation and §§ 876-887 for remission. 
93. GIORGIO BORDA. MANUAL DE OBLIGACIONES 377, 382 (Buenos Aires, 1974). 
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performance of an obligation. In the latter case, we have but an 
extension of the date of performance, and not a waiver of the 
right itself. Renunciation of a debt falls within the framework of 
renunciation in the broad sense.9• 
In Argentina, as well, renunciation is considered a bilateral, 
legal transaction, as the debtor's consent is required.911 Renunci-
ation can be made either for consideration or gratuitously.96 In 
the latter case, the question of the relationship between renunci-
ation and gift arises. The accepted view is that by giving a gift, 
one transfers ownership of property,97 where as renunciation en-
compasses every transfer, even abandonment. Indeed, because it 
is often difficult in day-to-day practice to distinguish between 
gift and renunciation, various proposed amendments to the code 
would expand the definition of gift to include renunciation.98 
Due to the bilateral nature of renunciation, the renouncing party 
may withdraw his renunciation as long as there has been no ac-
ceptance by the debtor. But this is subject to the proviso that 
the withdrawal not harm third-party interests, which arise be-
tween the date of renunciation and the date of withdrawa1.99 
In Argentinean law there is no presumption of renunciation. 
Therefore, we may speak of a renunciation only when we en-
counter a formal declaration or an unambiguous fact.loo 
Like renunciation, remission may be general or partial, and 
either for consideration or gratuitous. When remission is used in 
the general sense, it refers to an act done without considera-
tion:lol a wilful or necessary act, such as remission in the course 
of receivership. Remission can be explicit or implied. Contrary 
94. 2 JosE J. LLAMBIAS. C6D1GO CIYIL ANOTADO 857 (Buenos Aires, 1978). 
95. C6D. CIY. § 868 (Arg.). However in the case of renunciation of proprietary rights 
it is a unilateral act. BORDA, supra note 93, at 378. 
96. C6D. CIY. § 869 (Arg.). 
97. C6D. CIY. §1789 (Arg.). 
98. Thus it may be that there is no difference between 1) A giving B a sum of money 
as a gift and 2) A lending money to B , only later to waive his right to repayment: BORDA, 
supra note 93, at 381; JosE J. LLAMBIAS ET AL .. COMPENDIO DE DERECHO CIVIL, 535 (Bue-
nos Aires, 1976). 
99. The same rule appears in regard to gifts: C6D. CIY. §1789 (Arg.). 
100. See the case law brought in 2 LLAMBIAS, supra note 94, at 872. 
101. In Argentina, as in many other countries, doctrine basically claims that remis-
sion can be only gratuitous. Where there is consideration, we may speak in terms such as 
transaction, novation, or datio in solutum. 
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to other jurisdictions, such as Chile, explicit remission in Argen-
tina need not be made in ceremonial form, even when the debt 
has been drawn up in a notarized protoco1.102 
The Argentinean code itself gives an example of implied re-
mission: the creditor gives the note to the debtor of his own free 
will, so long as the debtor does not claim that the debt has al-
ready been discharged. l03 Another presumption in Argentinean 
law is that if the note is in the possession of the debtor, then it 
is presumed to have been given to him of the creditor's free 
will. 104 
K. THE NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE 
The bilateral character of remission of debts finds expres-
sion in the new Netherlands Civil Code. 1011 In Extinction of Obli-
gations we find: 
1. An obligation lapses if the creditor makes 
an offer to his debtor to renounce it, and the lat-
ter accepts that offer. 
2. A gratuitous offer to renounce (remission 
of debt), which has come to the knowledge of the 
debtor and has not been refused forthwith, is 
deemed to be accepted. 108 
The commentary specifically addresses the distinction be-
tween renunciation and remission: 
It is not clear whether the word "remission" 
in articles 1474 et. seq. of the existing code de-
notes every renunciation of a claim, or only gratu-
102. C6D. CIV. § 885 (Arg.). 
103. Clearly, this example does not rule out the possibility of other cases of implied 
remission. 
104. C6D. CIV. § 878 (Arg.)., which is based upon § 1282 of the Napoleonic Code. 
The norm had already been the subject of criticism in France: see 2 RIPERT & Bou· 
LANGER, supra note 42, at 692. In Argentina, it was recommended that both presump· 
tions be repealed, and that the rules of renunciation and remission be unified. See 3 JosE 
J. LLAMBIAS, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL, OBLIGACIONES 171 (Buenos Aires, 1977). 
105. NEW NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE, PATRIMONIAL LAW, bk. 6 (Deventer/Boston, 
1992). 
106. [d. bk. 6.1, § 10 (Neth.). 
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itous renunciation. In order to exclude any possi-
ble misunderstanding, the draft uses the word 
"renunciation" for every juristic act whereby a 
creditor relinquishes his claim, and, in accordance 
with common usage, the word 'remission' is used 
to denote gratuitous renunciation only. 
According to some legislation, a simple decla-
ration by the creditor that he renounces his claim 
is sufficient to cause the obligation to lapse. The 
draft has not adopted that view, because it should 
not be possible to thrust upon another person 
gifts which he does not want to accept from the 
donor. However, if the statute were to provide, as 
some other codes do, that a contract between 
creditor and debtor is required for every renunci-
ation, then that would suggest that mutual con-
sent must be proved in all cases. This would go 
too far in the other direction; for cases where the 
debtor objects to remission occur so rarely that 
the absence of any reaction may be interpreted as 
an assent. The proposed article therefore provides 
that an offer of remission which has come to the 
knowledge of the debtor, and has not been re-
jected by him forthwith, is deemed to be ac-
cepted. The rule promotes legal security, because 
it cuts off any dispute on whether the debtor has 
consented to the remission or not.107 
[Vol. 1:39 
In the new Code we find renunciation by contract (1) and 
the presumption of agreement of the debtor (2): 
Art. 160 (6.2.4.14a) 
(1) An obligation is exstinguished by a contract 
between creditor and debtor whereby the creditor 
renounces his claim. 
(2) An offer to renunciate by gratuitious title, ad-
dressed by the creditor to the debtor, is deemed 
accepted when it has come to the attention of the 
debtor and he has not rejected it without delay. 
107. [d. Text at 36, and Commentary at 234. 
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II. RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN ISRAELI LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
We have not conducted the foregoing comparative survey in 
order to indicate any particular foreign solution, nor to find the 
source from which the Israeli legislature directly or indirectly 
drew its legal principles. We accept the principle that "in the 
new Israeli legislation, there is no such direct-technical absorp-
tion, but only a general, indirect-conceptual relationship to for-
eign legal systems. "lOS 
In treating this question, Professor Barak writes: 
Even in the framework of "operative" juris-
prudence, we are not forbidden - and it appears 
to us as desirable - to turn to the foreign system 
from which the primary concept was drawn. Such 
recourse extends the depth of thought and can 
expand the options for construction. But it is not 
essentia1.109 
In light of the above, we shall return to our legal system. 
It seems clear that by the term vitur, the Israeli legislature 
means renunciation, and by mehilah it means remission of debt, 
just as those terms were translated in the Ministry of Justice's 
authorized translation of the Gift Law, 1968.110 As we have seen, 
these terms are well-known in the legislation and literature of 
those countries that have adopted a code system. What system 
has been adopted by the Israeli legislature? It seems clear that 
the legislature considered cases of renunciation and of remission 
made in the form of agreements: '[a] gift is completed by the 
donor transferring to the donee the ownership of the subject of 
the gift, while it is agreed between them that such subject is dis-
posed by way of gift;"lll and '[t]he donee is presumed to have 
108. Yadin, supra note 7, at 365. 
109. Barak, supra note 7, at 21. 
110. As stated above, it should be noted that vitur was translated as waiver in Con-
tracts (General Part) Law § 55 (c), 27 L.S'!. 117 (Isr.). Vitur is similarly translated in 
the Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, § 12,13 L.S'!. 73 (1959) (lsr.). And in 
light of this we examined the meaning of waiver in English Law. 
111. Gift Law, § 2, 22 L.S.I 113 (Isr.). 
23
Rabello: Renunciation of Right
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
62 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP LAW [Vol. 1:39 
agreed to the gift, unless he notifies the donor of its rejection 
"112 
B. RENUNCIATION AS A BILATERAL ACT 
It follows therefore, that renunciation and remlSSlon are 
viewed as bilateral acts done without consideration. However, 
this does not exhaust the subject. We must examine the lan-
guage of the law precisely. The law states: '[a] gift may consist 
in the donor's renunciation of a right against the donee or in the 
donor's remission of an obligation. . . . "113 The law does not say 
that every renunciation or remission takes the form of a gift. 
The legislature established that there are cases, perhaps many 
cases, in which it views renunciation and remission as instances 
of gifts to which the Gift Law applies. In drafting the Gift Law, 
the legislature considered gifts, and everything is therefore 
treated from that perspective. Had the legislature intended to 
specifically treat the subject of renunciation and remission, no 
doubt it would have begun with a definition along the lines of 
section 1 (c) of the Gift Law: '[a] gift is a transfer of the owner-
ship of property otherwise than for consideration."ll4 Thus it 
would have added: 'Renunciation is . . . ", and 'Remission is 
" 
It follows that a person desiring to give a gift may choose to 
do so by means of renunciation or remission, and in many in-
stances renunciation and remission will be viewed as gifts. In 
those cases, renunciation and remission are done without consid-
eration, and the Gift Law will apply. In such cases, the legisla-
ture has clearly established the bilateral, consensual character of 
the transaction. lUI But here, too, we must view the matter from 
the proper perspective. Weare concerned with a dispositive 
norm that, for example, the remission will have valid force by 
the donor's unilateral decision alone. Similarly, the parties may 
establish that the renunciation and remission shall not be 
granted "without consideration" but as a regular transaction for 
consideration. As Justice Orr noted: 
112. [d. § 3 (lsr.). 
113. [d. § 1 (c) (Isr.). 
114. [d. 
115. [d. §§ 2 - 3 (Isr.). 
24
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol1/iss1/3
1994] RENUNCIATION OF RIGHT 
Only when the renunciation is made without 
consideration may we view it as a gift. The re-
nouncer of the right must intend to benefit the 
receiver, while it must be clear that the renuncia-
tion is given without consideration.ll8 
63 
Moreover, we find elsewhere that renunciation can be either 
for consideration or gratuitous, such as "the gratuitous renuncia-
tion of a right."ll7 
It follows that in current Israeli law, the character of renun-
ciation is neutral, just as the character of transfer is neutral in 
the question of whether the transfer is done for consideration or 
gratuitously. The Sale Law1l8 applies in the former case, while 
the Gift Law applies in the latter. All is dependent upon the will 
of the parties, as it arises from their contract and conduct. So it 
is in the case of renunciation and remission. A person may re-
nounce a right within the framework of a larger transaction, in 
consideration for a price or other benefit, or he may renounce 
the right from a desire to benefit another person. If, for instance, 
Reuben wishes to give fifty shekels to each of his four children, 
and if one of his children owes him fifty shekels, then Reuben 
can remit that debt; the remission will be deemed a gift. Thus "a 
gift may consist in the donor's renunciation . . . or the donor's 
remission ... " If the parties did not establish otherwise, then 
this is a bilateral, legal transaction; it is assumed that the donee 
consents. 
Thus the character of renunciation is bilateral, as is a trans-
fer. If the remission results from a transaction, then it is clear 
that the parties must decide upon the terms. If the transaction 
is gratuitous, the presumption of section 3 of the Gift Law will 
apply. It is our opinion, that this also should be the preferred 
result in the case of renunciation by conduct. Clearly, the pre-
sumption of consent is not seen as strong as actual consent, but 
such is the nature of unilateral contracts, in which the act of one 
party is given greater expression than that of the other. 
116. Amina Abed v. Nemni 37(ii) P.O. 606, at 615 (1983) (Jsr.). 
117. Land Appreciation Tax Law § 63, 17 L.S.I. 193 (1963) (Jsr.). 
118. Sale Law, 17 L.S'!. 193 (Jsr.). 
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C. THE REASON FOR REMISSION 
In order to establish which rule shall apply to remission, we, 
and the judge, must examine the reason for granting the remis-
sion. By this we do not mean the causa in the strict sense em-
ployed by various continental systems, but in the sense com-
monly employed by laymen. In other words, a person may grant 
remission: as the result of another, general transaction; because 
he is under an obligation to do so (for example, where in a will 
to the benefit of A there is a modum obligating him to grant 
remission to B); or because he wishes to benefit another. As with 
a normal gift, the remitter may stipulate a condition or obligate 
the debtor to perform some act in regard to the gift. l19 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF REMISSION AND ITS LIMITS 
The discharge of the primary debt, as a result of renuncia-
tion or remission, brings with it the discharge of ancillary obliga-
tions, such as guarantees, and allows for the removal of real en-
cumbrances, such as mortgages. Clearly, a debtor will be 
discharged of his obligations only to the extent set by the 
creditor. 
E. RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION BY CONDUCT 
The presumption of the beneficiary'S consent enables us to 
recognize renunciation and remission by the creditor's conduct. 
Indeed, extreme care is necessary to establish that the creditor 
actually intended a waiver by the method of renunciation and 
remission. At times, a person is willing to accept only part of his 
due today, and this readiness, in itself, should not be viewed as a 
waiver-by-conduct of the remainder of his rights. 120 "It is well 
established, that in order to infer waiver from a person's con-
duct, that conduct must be clear, emphatic and unambigu-
OUS."l21 Moreover, the conduct must comprise of "some explicit 
119. Gift Law, § 5, 22 L.S'!. 113 (lsr.). 
120. We entirely agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in Mizrahi v. Israel, 
40(iii) P.D. 163 et seq.(1986) (lsr.). Per J. Goldberg, this case may be viewed as one 
wherein "a person acted due to the necessity of the circumstances and not due to the 
weighing of the commercial value, which is like a waiver of the remainder of the debt." 
121. Ben-Haim v. Cohen, 34(0 P.D. 564, at 570 (1980) (lsr.). 
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expression of actual waiver.Hl22 
The returning of an instrument to the debtor by the credi-
tor is a special form of conduct. It is generally presumed that 
the debtor received the instrument of the creditor's own will. 
However, this will, alone, is not sufficient to discharge the con-
tractual relationship. Rather, it must be accompanied by an in-
tention to relinquish the instrument forever. The person grant-
ing the waiver must be cognizant that he held an enforceable 
legal right. On the other hand, if the debtor willingly received 
the instrument, and his conduct reflected his intention to benefit 
from the discharge of the debt, he cannot later withdraw his 
consent and refuse the remission. 
A waiver of guarantees should not be construed as giving 
rise to a presumption of the remission of the entire debt. 
F. THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL BY THE REMITTER 
In matters of renunciation and remission, different debtors 
may have different interests. One may be interested in giving his 
immediate consent in the hope that the creditor will no longer 
enjoy a right of withdrawal; another may wish to reject the re-
mission and to pay his debt. It is, therefore, important to ascer-
tain at what point a waiver is realized. 
From the language of section 3 of the Gift Law, it appears 
that the presumption of consent applies only from the moment 
that the donee becomes aware of the gift, for the donee's silence 
is deemed consent, but not his lack of knowledge.123 Thus, until 
the moment that the beneficiary becomes aware of the remis-
sion, the remitter may withdraw. But once the debtor has be-
come aware of the remission, the presumption of consent comes 
into force. The creditor can no longer withdraw the remission, 
and the debtor can avail himself of a "reasonable time" in which 
to consider whether to accept the remission. Should he take no 
action during that "reasonable time," the debtor will be deemed 
to have consented to the remission. 
122. Winter v. Pfeffer, 24(ii) P.D. 541, at 548 (1970) (lsr.). 
123. Cf: 2 ZELTNER, supra note 38, at 79; Rabello, supra note 4, § 51; Tilocca, supra 
note 67, at 412 et seq. . 
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G. REJECTION OF REMISSION 
We have already had the opportunity to mention that the 
debtor enjoys the possibility of refusing a remission. We should 
now like to treat this more thoroughly. 
If, in every instance of gift, the donee is granted the oppor-
tunity to reject the gift by giving notice to the donor within a 
reasonable period of becoming aware of the gift,12' then this 
right should be even more stringently defended in the case of 
remission. Here we speak not of a simple gift, made without the 
existence of a prior obligatory relationship between donor and 
donee, but of the very opposite. Remission occurs in a creditor-
debtor relationship, in which the debtor has not yet fulfilled his 
obligation. 
The possibility of refusing to accept the remlSSlOn is in-
tended to protect the debtor's interest in fulfilling that obliga-
tion. That is, it is intended to defend the debto:t:'s interest to be 
discharged, not by remission, but by fulfilling his obligation in 
some manner that comprises an element of performance and 
payment. We are not concerned here with the debtor's interest 
in a timely discharge of his obligation,126 although remission, 
too, discharges a debt. We are concerned with protecting an in-
terest that differs from discharge, which is the debtor's interest 
in performing the contract. 
Furthermore, section 40 of the Contracts (General Part) 
Law126 should not create difficulties, primarily because in that 
case it is generally not intended that the debt be discharged and 
the debtor released from his obligation. Rather, it is to be as-
sumed that the person, who paid the creditor, will have recourse 
to the debtor to obtain reimbursement. 
It is, therefore, clear that the presumption of consent is 
124. Gift Law, § 3, 22 L.S.I 113 Osr.). 
125. This interest is protected, inter alia, in §§ 39, 43 (b) Contracts (General Part) 
Law; and in §19 Sale Law, which states: 'The buyer shall pay the price to the seller and 
shall take delivery of the thing sold." 
126. See Contracts (General Part) Law, § 40, 27 L.S.I. Osr.): 'An obligation may be 
fulfilled by a person other than the debtor, unless according to the nature of the obliga-
tion or to the agreement between the parties, the debtor must fulfill it personally." 
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valid only from th~ moment that the debtor is aware of the re-
mission. The debtor's silence is taken to express consent, but not 
so his ignorance. 
The debtor must express his rejection of the remISSIOn 
within a "reasonable time" from his awarenesS, thus nullifying 
the presumption of consent. It is not entirely clear whether we 
have here a case of suspensory condition or of resolutive condi-
tion. On the Continent, too, similar cases have yielded different 
solutions. In our opinion, the preferable solution is a resolutive 
condition. That is, the presumption of consent comes into force 
from the moment that the debtor becomes aware of the remis-
sion (section 3 of the Gift Law). And, indeed, a debtor usually 
will happily accept the discharge of his debt, and will gratefully 
view it as a gift. Therefore, it is desirable to bring about the 
consequences of the transaction at this early stage, and thereby 
bringing the legal situation in line with what generally occurs 
(quod plerumque accidit).l2'1 
In light of the above legal construction, it is clear that in the 
event of the rejection of a remission, the original obligation is 
revived. The discharge of the obligation is not final, but rather 
conditional, and the condition can potentially revive the prior 
legal relationship. The condition does not act directly upon the 
primary transaction, but acts upon the remission alone. The 
debtor's rejection cancels the remission; the discharge of the ob-
ligation is without force, and the obligation continues ex tunc. 
But, absent such rejection, the condition is rendered null after a 
reasonable period elapses from the time the debtor becomes 
aware of the remission, and the remission comes into force, fi-
nally discharging the debtor's obligation. 
The rejection of remission enters into force when notice is 
received by the grantor, as reflected in section 3 of the Gift Law. 
Up to that point, and generally as long as the creditor continues 
to stand by his remission, the debtor may withdraw his rejection 
and enjoy the remission. 128 
Rejection of the remission can be made in any form, 
127. See on the burden of notice: Guido Tedeschi, Burden and Frustration 16 
MISHPATIM 335, at 353 et seq. (1987). 
128. C{. Estate of Wessner v. Gutman, 229(i) P.O. 315 (1975) (Isr.). 
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whether written, oral, or by conduct, such as returning the letter 
to the creditor. But rejection may only occur within a reasonable 
period. Thus, for example, performance of the obligation imme-
diately following receipt of notice of remission will certainly be 
viewed as a rejection of the remission. However, this will not be 
the case when the performance is effected after the passage of a 
long period of time, under circumstances in which the debtor did 
not otherwise inform the creditor of his rejection of the 
remISSIOn. 
Non-rejection of the remISSIOn is expressed passively, by 
conduct that we construe to be consent under section 3 of the 
Gift Law. The debtor's inaction therefore finds expression as ob-
jective conduct.129 
Rejection of the remission should not be viewed as a form of 
renunciation, just as the rejection of a gift should not be so 
viewed. Particularly in a system, such as ours, in which the ele-
ment of consent is emphasized (even as a result of the presump-
tion of consent), the rejection of a remissionor of a gift should be 
viewed as expressing a desire not to enter into an agreement, 
without attributing to the debtor or donee any other 
intention. ISO 
The right to reject remission is, in our opinion, afforded to 
every primary debtor in the case of multiple debtors. Section 
55(c) of the Contracts (General Part) Law establishes: "If the 
creditor discharges one of the debtors ... the other is dis-
charged to the same unless .... " Clearly, if the other debtor does 
not wish to benefit from the remission, he may employ his right 
to reject the remission and its consequences, at least insofar as 
he is concerned. Indeed, the discharge of the other debtors is not 
a necessary consequence ex lege. The law allows the remitter to 
express other desires ("unless a different intention appears from 
the discharge") for as many remissions as debtors. In the case of 
129. See FRANCESCO SANTORO-PASSARELLI. DOTTRINE GENERALI DEL D!RITTO CIVILE 121 
et seq. (Napoli, 1959); PIETRO RESCIGNO. STUD! SULL'ACCOLLO 120 et seq. (Milano, 1958); 
KLAUS MANIG. DAS RECHTSWIRKSAME VERHALTEN 279 (Berlin, 1939). 
130. By this we reject the theory of FRANCESCO ALLARA. LE FATTISPECIE ESTINTIVE 
DEL RAPPORTO OBBLIGATORIO 254 (Torino, 1952), according to which rejection of remission 
is 'a type of renunciation of the remission." But see LUIGI FERRI. RINUNZIA E RIFIUTO 20 
et seq. (Milano, 1960). 
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the rejection of the remission by one of the debtors, the rejection 
will be effective only in regard to his part of the debt. 
Another question which we shall leave for further study is 
whether another creditor of the debtor can reject the debtor's 
rejection due to an interest that the creditor may have in releas-
ing the debtor from his obligation. Similarly, we shall leave open 
the question of whether a revived debt returns to the same situ-
ation that existed before the remission and, especially, whether 
the ancillary obligations - such as guarantees - revive, as well. 
H. REMISSIONS AND AN OBLIGATION TO REMIT 
The type of remission that we have discussed up to this 
point results in the debtor's automatic release from his obliga-
tions. Thus, we face an instance of a gift in liberando. The same 
result occurs when the donor renounces a specific right toward 
the donee, such as in renouncing a security interest or a mort-
gage. ISI In such cases, the following statement of Maimonides is 
apt: 
If he remits a debt that he holds against an-
other, or gives him the deposit held by him - it is 
a gift that is transferred by oral statement alone, 
without need for anything else. lSI 
The case is different where, instead of an immediate release 
and the real result achieved in that case, the remission or renun-
ciation is expressed as a promise to release the debtor at a later 
date. Such a promise - if not undertaken as part of a more gen-
eral transaction that benefits both sides - is an obligation to 
grant a future gift. Such an obligation to release the debtor in 
the future requires a written instrument, and the party making 
the promise can withdraw it as long as the donee (the debtor) 
does not change his situation in reliance thereon. ISS Such a right 
of withdrawal does not exist where the remitter waives it in 
writing. 
131. See also Gabriela Shalev, Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith 16 MISHPATIM 
295, at 321 (1987). 
132. Maimonides, 3:3, Laws of Acquisition and Gift. 
133. Gift Law, § 5, 22 L.S.!, 113 (Jsr.). 
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Similarly, the remitter may withdraw his obligation if the 
debtor acts in a disgraceful manner towards him or his family, or 
if there is a considerable deterioration of his economic 
situation.134 
I. REMISSION AS FULFILLMENT OF AN OBLIGATION BY THE 
REMITTER 
Remission may be granted for numerous reasons. A person 
may conclude that he should remit, not as an act of good will, 
nor because remission is worthwhile in the framework of his 
commercial relationship with the debtor, but because he is obli-
gated to do so due to another obligation that is external to the 
creditor-debtor relationship. If, for example, B owes a debt to A, 
it is possible, that as part of the obligation, A may find himself 
obligated toward C for some payment or to remit B's debt. Thus, 
A appears both as creditor and as debtor. He is "obligated" to 
remit the debt of the person who is "obligated" to him. 
Generally, such situations arise as a result of an obligation 
placed upon a beneficiary, as where C establishes in his will that 
A will be his heir (or will receive a gift) but that the inheritance 
(or gift) is restricted by a modus requiring A to remit B's debt. 
Clearly, in such cases the primary debt is discharged only when 
the actual remission is effected (and not by the obligation to re-
mit alone, or by placing the duty upon the beneficiary or donee). 
In such cases, remission is not granted out of the creditor's 
desire to benefit the debtor, but due to his desire to fulfil the 
obligation placed upon him by an external source, e.g., from a 
preliminary contract of a duty placed upon him by the testator. 
Nevertheless, we should not conclude that we face a special in-
stance of remission. In the relationship between A and C, one 
remains the creditor and the other the debtor. Remission does 
not change its character in accordance with whether the creditor 
remitted the debt due to an obligation or of his own free will. In 
both cases, the result is the loss of a right, on the one hand, and 
the discharge of an obligation, on the other. 
In none of the situations we have considered does the 
134. [d. § 5 (c). 
32
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol1/iss1/3
1994] RENUNCIATION OF RIGHT 71 
debtor become a party to the creditor's obligation, and the 
debtor may reject the remission. It is, however, possible that in 
the event of a rejection, we may view the rejection as an instance 
of the exercise of a right contrary to customary manner and the 
requirement of good faith. 136 But this possibility must be ap-
proached with care. As Rescigno writes concerning Italian law:186 
The formation of the final contract as per-
formance of the preliminary contract is an act 
that is no less obligatory than the performance of 
the contract. The only difference is that two par-
ties appear as obligated parties. Therefore, we 
must view the act of each party as a separate act, 
without confusing it with the act of the other ob-
ligated party.IS7 
In certain cases, it is possible to view an obligation requiring 
a creditor to grant remission as a contract to the benefit of a 
third party. 138 
J. TESTAMENTARY REMISSION 
There is an instance in which it would appear that the legis-
lature views the remission of an obligation as a unilateral act. 
The Succession Law states: 
A will can be expressed in terms of gift, re-
lease, acknowledgement, or in any other terms. IS9 
This is a unilateral act, because a testamentary bequest is a 
unilateral, legal transaction. However, we do not face an in-
stance in which the rules of gift or remission apply to such an 
act, but just the opposite. The language of the law must be pre-
135. Contracts (General Part) Law, § 39,27 L.S.I. 117 (lsr.). 
136. PIETRO RESCIGNO, INCAPACITA' NATURALE E ADEMPIMENTO 117 (Napoli, 1957). 
137. [d. at 119 et seq. For Israeli law cf. Izhak Englard, The Capacity and Guardi-
anship Law, 5722 - 1962, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS RELATING TO CONTRACTS, (Guido 
Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977). 
138. Contracts (General Part) Law, §§ 34-38 27 L.S.I. 117 (1973) (lsr.). See also 
Gabriela Shalev, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Party, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS 
RELATING TO CONTRACTS, (Guido Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977). 
139. Succession Law, § 54 (c), 19 L.S.I. 58 (1965) (lsr.). 
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cisely construed. What we have here is not a gift or a remission 
resulting from the testator's death, as section 8 (b) of the Suc-
cession Law states: 
A gift made by a person, which is intended to 
vest in the donee only upon the death of the do-
nor, is not valid unless it was made by a will in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law.140 
Therefore, what we have in our example is actually the lan-
guage of a gift or a remission, when in fact, there is neither a gift 
nor a remission, but a will made in that language. Therefore, the 
Law of Succession is to be applied here. 
K. FUTURE REMISSION UNDESIRABLE 
Up to this point we have considered cases in which a person 
remits an existing right or an existing debt. But there are cases 
in which a person waives a future right. As for gifts, here, too, 
the Gift Law provides no special arrangement.l4l The Family 
Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 1959, considers waiver of 
maintenance payments, stating: 
12. (a) An agreement as to, or a waiver of, the 
maintenance of a minor does not bind the minor, 
so long as it has not been confirmed by the Court. 
(b) An agreement as to, or a waiver of, the 
maintenance of a person of full age shall be made 
in writing; it may be confirmed by the Court. 
140. In our opinion, this section of the Succession Law should be given a restricted 
interpretation, and it should not be deemed to include gifts of future property. Regard-
ing renunciation, where there are results that are in part inter vivos and in part mortis 
causa, the rules of gifts or of succession will apply accordingly. See also Rabello, supra 
note 4, at 49; REPORT ON GIFTS § 6 (Civil Code Revision Office, Montreal, 1975): "A gift 
which takes effect, partly inter vivos and partly on the death of the donor, is subject to 
the rules governing gifts and those governing wills, according to the circumstances." This 
Article is based on the second part of Article 77. It makes no mention of 'future prop-
erty.' This concept is made superfluous as a result of Article I." On the problems arising 
today in the identification of future property in Quebec, see H. Roch, Donations, testa-
ments, legs, executeurs testamenta ires in 5 TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DU QUEBEC 114 et seq. 
(Montreal, 1953). 
141. Rabello, supra note 4, at 47 et seq. 
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13. (a) The Court may vary the provisions of 
an agreement, a waiver, or a judgment, if it thinks 
fit to do in view of circumstances which have 
come to the knowledge of the applicant, or of a 
change in circumstances which has occurred, after 
the agreement, waiver or judgment . . . 
73 
Referencing the Gift Law, Professor Tedeschi has pointed 
out that, in [the Israeli] legal system, renunciation can be ef-
fected only by agreement.142 Clearly, the Maintenance Law re-
lates to the legal situation that preceded the enactment of the 
Gift Law. Following the enactment of that law, the Maintenance 
Law must be accordingly construed, and we may state that it 
was the legislative intent to distinguish between the case where 
a general agreement concerning maintenance is made and the 
case where the beneficiary of the maintenance waives it. In such 
a case, the agreement can be effected by inaction, as a conse-
quence of the application of section 3 of the Gift Law. 
The difficult question that arises is whether renunciation of 
maintenance is always permitted, or whether situations exist in 
which it is desirable to avoid the force of renunciation, as where 
the renouncing party will be bereft of any real support, due to 
the renunciation, and will find himself in a situation intolerable 
for him or for society. In such a case, the law allows for rectify-
ing the situation through the intervention of the court. Gener-
ally speaking, the waiver of future property should be viewed as 
a promise to waive a future right, and, therefore, the waiver may 
be withdrawn in the event of a considerable deterioration in the 
grantor's economic situation or of disgraceful conduct towards 
the grantor or his family (section 5(c) of the Gift Law).143 
Professor Tedeschi rightly noted that it would be desirable 
to completely proscribe renunciation of maintenance, as the pos-
sibility for such renunciation often serves as a means for apply-
ing pressure in the course of divorce litigation, etc. The legisla-
ture has recognized the possibility of precluding renunciation, as 
in section 65(a) of the Succession Law, 1965: 
142. Guido Tedeschi, Duty of Maintenance in Israel Civil Law, in 6 MISHPATIM 242, 
at 247 et seq. (1975). 
143. As for renunciation by a minor, Capacity and Guardianship Law, § 20 (3),16 
L.S'!. 106 (1962) (Isr.) should also be kept in mind. 
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As agreement relating to maintenance under 
this Chapter or a waiver thereof, if made in the 
lifetime of the deceased, is void, and if made after 
his death, requires approval of the Court. 
[Vol. 1:39 
Up to now, we have treated renunciation in favor of a do-
nee, but it is clear that there are situations in which it would be 
desirable to prohibit renunciation in favor of the donor and his 
creditors, as well. This matter receives partial attention in sec. 
63 of the Succession Law. Whatever [Israel's] opinion may be 
concerning the possibility of drawing analogies from this 
norm,144 it is clearly desirable that a general norm in the form of 
the Actio Pauliana treats the issue of whether gifts and renunci-
ations are made to the detriment of creditors.l411 
L. RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN THE FUTURE CODE: SOME 
COMMENTS DE lURE CONDENDO 
From our examination we may conclude that workable solu-
tions can be found in existing laws. The question of whether re-
nunciation and remission are unilateral or bilateral acts is a gen-
eral one that requires the legislature's decision in favor of one or 
the other opinion. In the meantime, the Israeli legislature has 
chosen the course of bilaterality, with certain restrictions, and it 
does not stand alone in this respect. But what of the future? 
For some years now, the Ministry of Justice has been pre-
paring a part of the codification of Israel's civil law. A commit-
tee, under the chairmanship of Justice Aharon Barak,146 has 
been appointed to review the draft code. In perusing the Draft, 
we find that renunciation is first mentioned in Part B ("Con-
tracts, General Provisions"), Chapter 3 ("Performance of Con-
tracts"). Following the provisions regarding set-offs and guaran-
tees, we find section 093 that establishes: 
144. Rabello, supra note 4, at 37 et seq.; URIEL PROCACCIA. BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
CIVIL LEGISLATION IN ISRAEL 129 et seq. (Jerusalem, in Hebrew,1984). 
145. C. 7.75; D. 42.8. 
146. I wish to express my thanks to the Committee Chairman, Prof. Aharon Barak, 
for allowing me to quote the Draft. 
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Renunciation 
(a) Renunciation of a right may be effected 
by the creditor's notice to the debtor. 
(b) The renunciation is retroactively voided if 
the debtor informs the creditor of his rejection 
within a reasonable time after receiving the credi-
tor's notice. 
75 
It would appear that we have before us a change in direc-
tion by the future legislature, by which renunciation is portrayed 
as a unilateral act. However, let us continue our examination. 
Section 117(c) of the Draft - which parallels section 55(c) of the 
Contracts (General Part) Law - states: 
If the creditor discharges one of the debtors 
of his obligation, he is presumed to have dis-
charged the others, as well. 
The explanatory notes explain that the term "waiver, remis-
sion, compromise or otherwise have been eliminated as unneces-
sarily casuistic." 
We shall not here consider this particular point, but we note 
that the elimination of reference to renunciation, as in sec. 55(c) 
of the Contracts (General Part) Law, does not eliminate the in-
stitution itself, but seems simply to allow for the discharge of 
debtors by means other than renunciation and remission. 
Section 208 of the Draft, concerning gifts, states: 
Expanding the subject of the gift 
A gift may be made by renunciation of a 
right or by remission of an obligation. 
In order to complete the picture, it should be noted that the 
presumption of consent is preserved in regard to gifts. Section 
204 states: 
It is presumed that the donee agrees to re-
ceive the gift. However, the gift is retroactively 
nullified if the donee informs the donor of its re-
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jection within a reasonable period after he is in-
formed of it. 
[Vol. 1:39 
Moreover, the presumption of acceptance, presently found 
in section 7 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, is preserved 
almost verbatim in section 026 of the Draft: 
An offer which is exclusively for the benefit 
of the offeree is presumed to have been accepted 
by him unless he notifies the offeror of his rejec-
tion within a reasonable time after receiving it. 
From the above examination, it would appear that we are 
faced with an internal contradiction. The legislature is free to 
choose whatever arrangement it deems fit regarding: offers that 
only benefit the offeree; gifts; renunciation; and remission - a 
unilateral approach or a consensual approach that requires a 
real or supposed meeting of minds by way of a presumption of 
consent. But the legislature must be consistent in its choice. In 
the Draft there is a glaring contradiction between section 026 
and section 093. While the former establishes a presumption of 
consent, the latter assumes that we are concerned with a: unilat-
eral, legal transaction, that the beneficiary may reject (by means 
of another unilateral, legal transaction). It is difficult to ascer-
tain under what circumstances section 093 would ·have effect, for 
if the remission forms part of a more general transaction, clearly 
the express consent of the other party is required. But if the 
remission is made without consideration, then even before turn-
ing to the question of gifts, the presumption of consent under 
section 026 will take effect. 147 
Although the former case concerns a contract and the latter 
a unilateral act, both cases concern transactions that are com-
pleted with the debtor's knowledge or upon his receiving notice. 
They are conditional upon a subsequent rejection within a rea-
sonable time. It is difficult to establish whether we are faced 
147. See the commentary to § 7 of the Contracts Law in Gabriela Shalev, Forma-
tion of Contract, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS RELATING TO CONTRACTS, 55 et seq. (Guido 
Tedeschi, ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977). Among the examples brought by Prof. 
Shalev of offers that only benefit the offeree is an offer to discharge a debtor of his debt 
(p. 56). However, Shalev's distinction between such an offer and a gift leaves some 
doubts in light of § 1 (c) of the Gift Law. 
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with a case that falls within the framework of section 026 or sec-
tion 093. The matter becomes even more complicated when sec-
tions 204 and 208 come into play, placing gratuitous remission 
within the consensual-bilateral framework. It should be noted 
that even under section 093 itself, the Jewish law principle that 
"a person is benefitted even in his absence" is not adopted. 148 
Let us examine the explanatory notes to section 093: 
This is a new provision. Book XII of the 
Mejelle "On Settlement and Release" was voided 
by section 62(1) of the General Contracts Law, as 
it was thought that no further need of it existed. 
But arguments have been heard, primarily from 
Professor Tedeschi, that a "gap" was thus cre-
ated. Therefore, it is now suggested that we re-
turn to this subject. Instead of mentioning renun-
ciation and remission (which are one and the 
same) as was done in the Gift Law, section l(c), it 
is now suggested here and also in the chapter on 
gifts, to speak of renunciation alone. 
Subsection (a): The provision brings only the 
principle question of renunciation by unilateral 
notice. Of course, this is not to prevent renuncia-
tion by way of agreement between the creditor 
and the debtor. 
Subsection (b): This provision and its phras-
ing follow sections 26 and 51 above. 
It would seem that several factors were not taken into ac-
count. First, Professor Tedeschi's comment was made when the 
Gift Law was still in draft form and before enactment of the 
Contracts (General Part) Law. As we observed, Professor 
Tedeschi agrees that after the repeal of section 12 of the Mejelle 
renunciation is consensual. 149 In our opinion, renunciation and 
remission should not be viewed as equivalent. They are two dif-
ferent legal concepts, even though remission of debts is generally 
viewed within the broader framework of renunciation of rights. 
But there is a difference between the two, as the vast literature 
on the subject attests.1CiO It is, therefore, only proper that section 
148. See the discussion of this point in Rabello, supra note 4, at 83 et seq. 
149. See supra note 10. 
150. We refer to the literature mentioned above. Generally, the term renunciation is 
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208 continue to speak of renunciation and remission, the explan-
atory notes notwithstanding. lIIl 
We may, therefore, conclude that the "new provision" that 
is urged for the new code has no right to exist in the legal frame-
work that the code itself establishes, unless the legislature ex-
cludes sections 026, 204 and 208. But the "future legislature" 
does not face a vacuum, as codification is pending. A guiding 
principle of law requires that stability and certainty be pre-
served. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for change only when 
the existing law is not compatible with new realities or is wrong 
from its inception. 
In our opinion, it is necessary to establish a general provi-
sion treating the matter of discharge by means of other than the 
usual method of discharge through payment. Such means may 
include, for example: confusio, compensatio, remissio, novatio 
and impossibility that arises after the formation of a contract, 
due to causes that cannot be attributed to the debtor. Such a 
general provision would allow for broad treatment of the ques-
tion of discharge of obligations and would also make an impor-
tant contribution to the theory of contract. In any event, the 
attempt to treat the subject of remission in the general part of 
the section on contracts, as well, is praiseworthy. In this frame-
work, we would retain the presumption of consent, as estab-
lished in section 7 of the Contracts (General Part) Law. It seems 
to us that the ideas underlying the provision is a contractual 
principle that requires a person's consent to acts that appear to 
be done entirely for his benefit, while taking into account that, 
in practice, in the majority of cases a person accepts that which 
used in regard to proprietary rights, such as mortgages, while remission is used in regard 
to obligation. 
151. We should emphasize that despite the dogmatic difference (unilateral as op-
posed to bilateral act), in fact there is no difference between the two provisions. On the 
basis of § 333 of the law, the remitter notice to the debtor is, in fact, sufficient, and we 
have already concluded that, regarding the debtor, the creditor's notice becomes effective 
immediately upon its coming to the debtor's notice. Similarly, we have already concluded 
that the rejection operates ex tunc, just as is proposed in the case of a unilateral act. 
Even at present, renunciation is realized after the creditor's notice to the debtor, taken 
together with the presumption of consent! Nevertheless, it is possible that there would 
be differences insofar as the date of realization of the renunciation itself, the possibility 
of withdrawing the renunciation, the question of the death of either the debtor or credi-
tor, the question of the debtor's capacity, etc. Clearly the legislature did not intend to 
bring about changes in these matters. 
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is done to his benefit. 
In our opinion, we should not draw a distinction between 
cases of unilateral acts1ll2 that require rejection by the benefi-
ciary, and bilateral acts that require consent. The contractual 
principle that is expressed by the presumption of consent and 
that allows for the donee's rejection of a unilateral benefit 
should be a consistent principle throughout the code, while al-
lowing the parties to choose otherwise, should they so desire. In 
so doing, the legislature will not change the course already plot-
ted - a path that appears to conform in principle to Jewish law, 
as well as to progressive legislation (such as article 1 of section 
10 of the Netherlands Civil Code (Book 6». 
As we have seen, even in the case of codes, such as the Ital-
ian code, which appear to establish a unilateral principle, there 
is no lack of jurists who argue that the act is, in fact, bilateral. If 
the situation is already clear in our system, why complicate mat-
ters? We would waive such a change. 
152. We should emphasize that Israeli law recognizes a large number of unilateral 
juristic acts, such as: recission due to mistake (§ 14 of the Contracts Law), duress (§ 17) 
and extortion (§ 18); a beneficiary's notice of rejection of a right that is his under a 
contract to the benefit of a third party (§ 35); appropriation of payments (§ 50); choice 
between alternative obligations (§ 51); setting off (§ 53); recission of a contract for 
breach (§ 7 of the Contract (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 25 L.S.I. 71 (1970»; 
creation of agency by the principal's authorization of the agent (§ 33 of the Agency Law, 
19 L.S'!. 231(1965»; etc. See Barak, supra note 7. The matter requires further examina-
tion and study. 
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